In their work entitled The gender of capital. How the family reproduces inequalities, Sociologists Céline Bessière and Sibylle Gollac address in a box what they call "A sexist unthought: the taxation of alimony". The two researchers deplore that " The taxation of alimony in France does not contribute to reducing economic inequality between men and women following a separation, quite the contrary! » (Bessière & Gollac, 2020).

Here is how the two sociology experts pose the problem: “ Separated women must declare alimony payments as part of their income and pay taxes on them, while male debtors deduct them from their taxable income. The rationale for this tax is mysterious: why would a separated father deduct from his income tax his contribution to the maintenance (food, housing, other expenses) of his children, when this is not the case for parents who live with their children? ».

From the outset, let us recall that this is only a debate concerning privileged households: in fact, disadvantaged households are exempt from income tax (around half of households in France).

The two authors do not mention the advantage of the family quotient for the benefit of the parent receiving alimony (Bessière & Gollac, 2020), which is very surprising given its fiscal importance!

Indeed, the current tax system is based on an egalitarian tax principle, in the sense that it gives parents one tax advantage and one only, whether they are together or separated, whether they live with the child or not (its truly egalitarian nature can be debated, especially since it can depend on the level of income).

When parents are not separated, they declare their income jointly and therefore benefit from the family quotient and there is then no tax exemption. In this case, the father and mother are deemed to consent to the expenses incurred for the benefit of the household whereas this is not the case for the maintenance payments transferred to the household of the resident parent (the separated mother spends the amount received as she sees fit without any obligation to provide information, which justifies considering that it is indeed a taxable resource since no real control is possible as to the best interests of the child).

In the event of joint custody "No alimony is deductible in the event of joint custody because you benefit from an increase in the number of family quotient shares." (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2021), although it could be argued that since the family quotient for the child is reduced by half, alimony could be deductible because it relates to another object. 

In the event of separation, the parent with whom the child does not usually reside, if he pays alimony, then the transfer of resources to the other parent can be deducted from his income: this is the tax exemption of alimony! Before separation, the joint declaration of income is fiscally advantageous for the wealthier spouse compared to a situation of separation. This also gives rise to demands for individualization of income tax which would be too favorable to the member of the couple with the highest income within it, that is to say generally men, potentially discouraging the participation in the labor market of the spouse with the lowest income, that is to say generally women (Allègre & Périvier, 2017). After separation, the separated father, wealthier than the mother, is therefore already penalized fiscally compared to a previous situation where the couple jointly declared their income.

If the parents are separated, the parent with whom the child usually resides benefits from the family quotient. This mechanism, which reduces the progressiveness of the tax, makes it possible to considerably reduce income tax.

Here is a simplified digital illustration with a numerical example on the disparity between the comparative advantage of the family quotient and the tax exemption of the alimony paid.

Let's take a couple with two children who separate, with the children's habitual residence set at the mother's. Let's assume that the father has an income of 60 euros per year, or 000 euros per month. Let's assume that the mother has an income of 5 euros per year, or 000 euros per month.
Let's assume that the alimony fixed by judgment amounts to 500 euros per month per child, in other words 1000 euros per month that the father owes the mother for the maintenance of the two children, after the separation or divorce.

What are the tax effects on both parents of the family quotient and the tax-free portion of the father's income transferred to the mother, pension received taxed for her?

In this example, after transfer of alimony, the mother has an income of 4 euros per month (000 euros + 3 euros of alimony received) and the father also has an income of 000 euros per month (1 euros – 000 euros of alimony paid), i.e. 4 euros of annual income for each of the two parents.

How much income tax (IR) will these parents with equivalent declared income (after transfer of alimony) pay?

The single father, with only one share in his tax household, will owe the tax authorities 6 euros per year, or 882 euros per month in income tax, while the mother with two and a half tax shares (573 because half a share per child as well as the half share for a single parent and of course a share for the adult in the household, but the tax advantage is capped) will owe 2,5 euros per year, or 1 euros per month. The non-resident father will therefore pay 940 euros more per month in income tax than the resident mother.

In short, her real disposable income of 3 euros per month (427 euros – 4 euros in taxes) will be lower than that of the mother of 000 euros per month (573 euros – 3 euros in taxes).

Source: DGFIP, General Tax Code, Bercy infos; calculations by Cyrille GODONOU

So while initially the father earned 5 euros per month, which is significantly more than the mother whose income was 000 euros per month (3% more in favour of the father), after the application of the family quotient, the tax exemption of the alimony paid by the debtor and the taxation of the alimony received by the creditor, it is the father who now has lower income after tax: he has a disposable income of 000 euros per month compared to 66 euros per month for the mother, which is 3 euros less per month (427% less). The situation has therefore been reversed dramatically after redistribution (transfer of alimony and taxation, in particular via the family quotient mechanism).

However, Gollac and Bessière in Genre du capital do not mention the family quotient by claiming that non-resident parents (generally fathers) are advantaged by the socio-fiscal system, by being able to deduct child support while resident parents (mothers) are obliged to deduct child support received, which is an injustice according to their argument. This numerical example shows that the presentation of these two activist sociologists is questionable. The tax advantage of the family quotient should not be overlooked.

In addition to these tax benefits, there are social benefits linked to the child being attached to the household where he or she usually resides. Social assistance for the child is paid in full to the resident parent: back-to-school allowance, family allowances, subsidized canteen, tariff advantages for single-parent families, priority in access to social housing, etc.

Furthermore, the more the father is involved in the lives of his children, by contributing to exceptional expenses, by welcoming them in good conditions during visitation and accommodation rights, the higher his expenses for their benefit (without any tax advantage) will be, representing a significant fraction of the expenses of the resident mother, especially for fixed expenses independent of the actual time spent with the child, such as at the home of the non-resident father for the child: providing an additional bedroom, a bicycle, a computer, etc.

Thus, the reasoning of Bessière and Gollac consisting in presenting as an anomaly the fact that non-resident parents benefit from a tax advantage after the separation, the alimony then being deducted from their taxable income, omits that they benefited from the tax advantage of the family quotient before the separation. However, the two sociologists do not propose the maintenance, even if only in proportion to the time spent with the child during visitation and accommodation rights, of the family quotient for the non-resident parent (generally separated fathers). Bessière and Gollac also do not emphasize the significant tax advantage that the family quotient brings for separated resident parents (generally mothers). It is therefore to be feared that this is a new illustration of activist biases in research, biases attested on questions of gender (Eagly, 2016) and more generally concerning inequalities in the field of identity politics (Jussim, Crawford, Anglin, Stevens, & Duarte, 2016). Unfortunately, " Academics can also obscure accurate findings and useful information, which is problematic for the progress of social science research. » (Clark, Honeycutt, & Jussim, 2020). 

Bibliography

Allègre, G., & Périvier, H. (2017, July 7). The choice to individualize your tax for couples. Retrieved from OFCE: https://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/pbrief/2017/pbrief22.pdf

Bessière, C., & Gollac, S. (2020). 5. Family peace in the shadow of the taxman and at the expense of women. Retrieved from In The Gender of Capital (2020), pages 167 to 197: https://www.cairn.info/le-genre-du-capital–9782348044380-page-167.htm?contenu=resume

Clark, C., Honeycutt, N., & Jussim, L. (2020, February 10). Replicability and the Psychology of Science. Retrieved from Questionable Research Practices in Psychology. New York: Springer.: https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fsites.rutgers.edu%2Flee-jussim%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2Fsites%2F135%2F2021%2F02%2FReplicability-and-the-Psychology-of-Science_1.21.20.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK

Eagly, A. (2016, March). When Passionate Advocates Meet Research on Diversity, Does the Honest Broker Stand a Chance? Accessed December 19, 2019, at https://www.psychologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:94328113-6e62-4545-80a5-9c2ac865c95d/Eagly-2016-Journal_of_Social_Issues.pdf

Jussim, L., Crawford, JT, Anglin, SM, Stevens, ST, & Duarte, JL (2016, March 24). Interpretations and methods: Towards a more effectively self-correcting social psychology. Retrieved from Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 66 (2016) 116–133: https://sites.rutgers.edu/lee-jussim/wp-content/uploads/sites/135/2019/05/Jussimetal2016JESPmethodspaper.pdf

Ministry of Economy and Finance. (2021, March 19). Income tax: the deduction of alimony. Retrieved from Bercy infos: https://www.economie.gouv.fr/particuliers/deduction-pensions-alimentaires-impot-revenu