A controversial and censored conference
The subject of Florence Bergeaud-Blackler's March 5 conference at the Hauts-de-France regional council in Lille has already been presented many times at the request of various associations claiming to be left-wing or right-wing, or not displaying any partisan label. The work she presents[1]is not a political manifesto, or a militant treatise, but a scientific book with a didactic aim. It is therefore all the more surprising that this conference could not take place in a university, for reasons that remain most curious in view of the quality of the work… This sum on Frérisme is in fact the result of thirty years of research, begun in Bordeaux and then extended to the national scale.
The ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood: between tradition and modernity
This treaty is a salutary reminder, it highlights an organization that prefers to prosper in the shadows: the Muslim Brotherhood. A brotherhood founded in 1928 by a young Egyptian student, Hassan el-Banna, revolted by the Westernization of the elites of his country and anxious to lead a re-Islamization – according to his own views – of Egypt and the Islamic world. The brotherhood then expanded in a regional context marked by the fall of the Ottoman Empire, then the dissolution of the caliphate in 1925. A shocking disappearance for contemporaries and which questions many Arab thinkers, then perplexed about the attitude to adopt in the face of Western modernity and its influence in the Middle East. The current of the salafiyya thus emerges at the beginning of this century, and gives birth to several entities that certainly differ in the means of action, but nevertheless share a common origin. Jihadism represents armed combat, leading in an assumed way the holy war; political Islam designates the foundation of national political parties, able to take power by the ballot box, as illustrated by Erdoğan in Turkey; the Brotherhood is another dimension: a transnational network of indoctrinated militants, aiming at the establishment of a caliphate.
The Muslim Brotherhood has its mentors, notably Yusuf al-Qaradâwi, the successor of el-Banna, and it maintains a paradoxical relationship with modernity. Indeed, political and social modernity is prohibited, a good Muslim Brotherhood activist must track down and eliminate the "illicit" in his home or neighbor (willingly or by force as far as he is concerned), to reject the nation-state which would only be an avatar of Western unbelievers. However, they are in no way archaic preachers lost in the ruins of Palmyra or the caves of the Hindu Kush, they are fervent followers of technological modernity, of the use of all means at their disposal to spread the message of the brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is both revolutionary and pragmatic. To make sharia reign with a whip, it is appropriate to make it happen with tweets.
Their ultimate goal? To restore the caliphate, which would follow their precepts and their interpretation of Islam. As el-Banna wrote, "We are an idea, a dogma, a line of conduct," with theocracy as the final goal. To this end, al-Qarâdâwi put forward a long-term strategy in the 1990s, aiming to seize power by assuming the constant balance of power with the established states. And if the brotherhood was born in Egypt and continues to act in the Muslim world, it has since found a land of mission in the West.
A strategy of infiltration and gradual conquest
Its emergence was initially very discreet, through an effort to preach on North American campuses, taking advantage of the climate of freedom of expression in the 1960s and, more broadly, the facilities offered by liberal democracy in the United States. While Western morals frightened some thinkers, who returned to their countries of origin like Sayyid Qutb, one of the leading thinkers of contemporary jihadists, others saw the West as a land of mission, a space conducive to subversion and conquest, designated as the "Dar al-Ahd" or "land of the pact". The West became a priority target, an objective to be conquered or, according to the author, a "Sharia-compatible" society.
To do this, the brotherhood follows what could rightly be called a battle plan, an "Islamization from near to far". Recruitment is done on various scales, but preferably by targeting young individuals, hoping that they can convert their family to the doctrine of the movement, by a ripple effect. The associative world and sports clubs are also places of privileged proselytism. Note however that this recruitment is not open to all, it is done on the contrary by a careful selection. An individual judged promising is first approached within the framework of an associative activity or a sports club, allowing him to be tested and then re-educated in the long term. Thus, he gradually becomes a full member, progressing in the hierarchy thanks to his loyalty and if he was not accepted as a new Brother, no matter, the brotherhood has had plenty of time to indoctrinate him.
These methods remain discreet, and the Muslim Brotherhood carefully hides the extent of its activities, although it does not hesitate to show itself in public on occasion. Particularly during the congress of the Muslims of France (MF), formerly the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), held every year, and undoubtedly the most important manifestation of political Islam in a European public space.
A conquering movement, with a revolutionary doctrine, this battle plan follows a line erected by al-Qarâdâwi in his writings: to form an avant-garde elite, to imbue public opinion with the vocabulary of the brotherhood (hence the term "Islamophobia" so widespread today) and to prepare an international climate ready to receive the movement with a certain indulgence. Their goal has therefore been clearly stated by the leaders of the movement, with real danger. The capacity to adapt to local circumstances, to adapt their vocabulary to the militant language of the radical left, explains how the latter has been able to be increasingly infiltrated, in France as in Belgium or the United Kingdom.
So we are dealing with a planned offensive and, perhaps most worryingly, its objectives seem well on the way to achieving their goals, served by an all too widespread blindness... not to mention a healthy dose of cowardice among the French elite.
