For some time now, we have noticed in the media and in certain polemical works a frequent use of the notion of "moral panic".[1]. So, Le Monde has recently given a large place in its pages to the volume by Quebec political scientist Francis Dupuis-Déri entitled "Panique à l'université". However, what is striking in Dupuis-Déri's use of the notion of moral panic is that he presents it as an explanatory and even scientific notion. Its inventor Stanley Cohen was nevertheless aware of proposing a normative notion useful for the purposes of what he called his own "cultural politics". Indeed, in an enlightening autobiographical text, but not cited by Dupuis-Déri, bearing the significant title "Whose side were we on? The undeclared politics of moral panic theory", he clearly stated three years before his death that there are "good" and "bad" moral panics and that the supporters of his notion mainly study "bad moral panics", that is to say those they do not like, and must take sides in this normative struggle by placing themselves on the side of those they consider to be "dominated", in one form or another. Cohen was, however, reflective enough to admit that it is easier for sociologists of moral panics to identify with moral entrepreneurs who are close to them in terms of "social class, education and ideology." [2]. Although Dupuis-Déri states that only "those who are unfamiliar with the sociological theory of moral panics" (p. 61) dare to criticize it, we will dare to question the precise meaning of this notion which has become fashionable.
So let's take a closer look at this concept. First, let's note that the choice of the term "panic" is strategic because it evokes a strong and sudden reaction, tending towards the irrational; it therefore has a clearly negative connotation. This choice alone ensures that its use can only be polemical and only function as an insult. Who can say that they are happy to panic? According to the dictionary Larousse (and common sense), it actually means "sudden and unreasonable terror, often collective", which the dictionary confirms if need be Robert which rather says "which suddenly and violently disturbs the mind". The key notion which gives its meaning to this notion is therefore that of the suddenness of the reaction. As there are several types of panic, it remains to specify the meaning that Cohen gives to "moral". Although he uses the expression hundreds of times in his classic work on the subject[3], he actually elaborates very little and seems to take the expression for granted, contenting himself with saying at the beginning of his work that moral panic threatens the "values and interests of society". It is therefore threats to "values" that make the panic then "moral". But the vagueness immediately appears with the addition of the notion of interests which, beforehand, does not fall within the moral register in the usual sense of the term. More interesting still, Cohen places little emphasis on the temporal variable, namely the necessary suddenness associated with any non-metaphorical panic. This mixture of "values" and "interests", the joint use of two symbolically strong words and, finally, the vagueness surrounding the temporality of actions have, in our opinion, strongly contributed to the popularity of this notion and especially to its abusive extension to any situation that displeases someone who can then claim that his adversaries are panicking. It is very likely that Cohen himself would deplore that his notion has thus gone from a sometimes useful "concept" to a freely thrown "insult". texts A recent article by a sociology doctoral student even announced to us "A moral panic called "tips"!" Unsurprisingly, the analyst identified "conservative columnists" as those responsible for this so-called panic, as if the simple fact of asking the question of the legitimacy of certain tips led to ipso facto condemnation. Above all, we can deplore that instead of explaining the phenomena, sociologists prefer to play moralists and pronounce sentences.
Who's panicking?
As we can see, the common sense associated with the notion of panic is offended when the term is applied wrongly and indiscriminately. However, if we stick to a precise definition of moral panic, we curiously arrive at the conclusion that the panics observed in the academic world in recent years have in fact all been the work of a few students who launched alerts, immediately followed by university management who (in a few hours or days) reacted with press releases or even suspensions. Indeed, in the cases reported by the media (not to mention the cases that are not publicized but that circulate in several university corridors), it is indeed students, deans, vice-presidents and presidents ("rectors" in Quebec) who reacted suddenly to words spoken by teachers and to sentences read in texts that were part of courses. These reactions correspond well to the notion of moral panic, while the teachers involved were, themselves, rather victims.
Moral panic is therefore not at all à the university (as the title of Francis Dupuis-Déri's work suggests) but rather among certain "progressives" and self-proclaimed moral entrepreneurs who claim to embody good and justice above ordinary mortals, on whom they can then attempt to impose their vision of the world by multiplying incantations, condemnations and peremptory affirmations.
On the other hand, the reactions of most academics to attacks on academic freedom are neither "panics" nor "moral". Indeed, discussions on this issue are mostly posed and argued and stretch over several years, a temporality incompatible with the polemical notion of "panic" but specific to reflective thought. If we prefer the vocabulary of cognitive psychology, let's say that panic is part of "system 1" which reacts in the moment and without thinking while defenders of academic freedom set in motion "system 2" which requires stepping back and reflection, two actions that unfold over a long period of time.[4]. Furthermore, it can be argued that the idea of academic freedom is not strictly speaking a moral category but rather a functional one, because it is inseparable from the specific mission entrusted to the university, namely the production and dissemination of knowledge validated by recognized methods. And as Bill 32, passed without opposition by the National Assembly of Quebec on June 3, 2022, rightly states, “university autonomy and university academic freedom constitute essential conditions for the accomplishment of the mission of these educational institutions.” [5]
From moral panic to denial
To explain the blindness on the part of those who deny the reality of what is happening at university and make pseudo-scientific use of the notion of "moral panic", we can invoke another notion used by Stanley Cohen in another of his works – not cited by Dupuis-Déri – that of denial. [6]. Cohen was indeed aware that if there are indeed moral panics, there are also strategies of denial, the two concepts even calling each other in a way. He identifies three kinds of denial: literal denial (nothing happened), interpretive denial (something happened but it is not what you think) and implication denial (what happened is not bad and does not have the consequences you think). [7].
As for the few activists who seek to generate moral panics on campuses, they are perfectly described under the category of moral entrepreneurs deployed by the sociologist Howard Becker in his classic work outsiders [8]Howard S. Becker, Outsiders. Studies in the sociology of deviance, Paris, Métaillé, 1985, pp. 171-188. These crusaders act, according to Becker, in reaction to a "form of evil that deeply shocks them." They are inspired by "an uncompromising ethic" and "all means seem justified to them to eliminate" evil. These people, he adds, are fervent, virtuous and "often even imbued with their virtue." It is also interesting to note that "moral crusades are generally led by members of the upper class" who thus add "to the power that derives from the legitimacy of their moral position the power that derives from their superior position in society." Finally, these "moral crusaders" often move from one cause to another and become "professionals in the discovery of injustices to be repaired," a phenomenon easily observed on campuses. The interest of Becker's analysis is that he does not judge their actions as good or bad, but examines and describes them as a sociologist, not as a moralist or polemicist.
The polemicists, Dupuis-Déri tells us, "are not sincerely interested in the University and what really happens there, nor in knowledge, nor in understanding" (p. 310-311). Curiously, in a sort of return of the repressed, this describes very exactly the content of Panic at the universityThis book, written by a specialist in the anarchist movement, will greatly appeal to university leaders who certainly prefer to manage problematic situations "internally" - and away from criticism - and above all to save on the need for reflection. on the centrality of freedom of teaching and research in the fundamental mission of the university. In the name of generous but (knowingly?) vague and ill-defined notions of "social justice", "equity, diversity and inclusion", moral entrepreneurs believe that they can put their own conceptions of social justice before, and even to the detriment of, academic freedom. In their ideological blindness, they thus confuse different orders of action, a confusion that it is entirely legitimate to criticize, just as it is legitimate and even more necessary than ever to resist these injunctions that undermine the mission of the university. All this without being intimidated by the cloud of insults that poorly hides the argumentative weaknesses of an indigent thought.
