Despite its reputation for seriousness, Le Monde published an article on April 17 that clearly misunderstood the definition of secularism; and despite his reputation for objectivity, he refused to give the following response.

In this column, Jean-Fabien Spitz argues that the growing number of incidents related to the 2004 law banning ostentatious religious symbols in schools should be an opportunity to remind people, against lies and falsifications, of what the principle of secularism is that this law is supposed to defend but which it actually violates. However, by omitting a few essential points, and especially by concealing the primary threat (the entry of Muslim fundamentalism and extremism into public places – the words “veil” and “Islam” do not appear in the text), the philosopher’s argument misses its target.

First of all, let us recall that the "freedom of conscience" guaranteed by the Republic in Article 1 of the 1905 law includes freedom of belief, something that we readily forget, the freedom not to believe. Not to mention the freedom not to believe is to confuse secularism with the Anglo-Saxon conception of tolerance which presupposes that belonging to a religion is inherent in man. Even today, in the United States, a great country of religious freedom and tolerance, it is practically impossible for an authority or celebrity to publicly declare themselves agnostic or atheist.

Certainly, veiled students do not harm material public order, the material interests of third parties, their lives, their property. But is it true to maintain, as Jean-Fabien Spitz does, that they do not harm their freedom? To say that the Islamic (or even Islamist) veil is only a garment would be like saying that the fascist salute is only a gesture (there are cases where Godwin's point is not without propaedeutic virtue). The Islamic veil is also, is first and foremost a flag, a standard. It does not only signify the religious affiliation of those who wear it, it commands other young girls of the same origin to wear it, de facto It denounces and stigmatizes. The veil has a discriminatory and accusatory meaning. It is because it contradicts freedom of belief that it violates the principle of secularism, and this is why the 2004 law prohibits it.

Certainly, the 1905 law (which, let us recall, does not contain the term "secularism" either in its title or in its articles) only speaks of the rights and duties of the Republic, it only concerns religious institutions and property, as well as freedom of worship, without ruling on civil society itself. It had not foreseen the case where students in public schools would exert religious pressure not only on their classmates, but on the educational institutions themselves. The neutrality of the State in matters of religion obviously does not mean its indifference when freedom of conscience is threatened.

It is factually false, as Jean-Fabien Spitz assures us to better legitimize the Muslim veil in schools, that "proselytism is a legitimate component of religious belief": Judaism and Hinduism, to cite only these two well-known examples, ignore proselytism, as do all vernacular religions. Moreover, Islam is not a simple belief, it is a way of life, a disruptive world view, and, in its fundamentalist and extremist version, a negation of democracy and the Republic, and therefore of the principles and values ​​that give it meaning, starting with secularism. It is therefore not a simple "difference", as is blandly said, that our "republican fabric" should recognize and integrate. It is not impossible that, in his desire to reduce secularism to tolerance, Jean-Fabien Spitz shows himself to be a faithful disciple of John Locke, of whom he is one of our best specialists. In the Letter on Tolerance (1686), who would inspire Voltaire, the English philosopher made two exceptions: for Catholics, because, being subservient to the Pope, they risked being disloyal to their government, and for atheists, because, not fearing hell, their oath was unreliable. Lesson to ponder: how could the free expression of religious beliefs in schools tolerate those who did not share them?